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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MELANY ZOUMADAKIS, 
Plaintiffi'Appellant, 
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL 
CENTER, and individuals DR. 
MARK MASON, LLOYD 
NIELSON, CAROLYN SMITH, and 
JOHN DOES 1-10. 
Defendants/Appellees. 
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF 
(ORAL ARGUMENT 
REQUESTED) 
App. Case No. 20080067 
APPELLANT REPLY BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
AH parties to this action admit and agree that the Utah Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction in this matter, and as such jurisdiction is proper. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE JURY VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DR. MASON MUST BE REVERSED 
A. APPELLANT HAS SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
Defendant's first argument against Plaintiffs appeal is that she did not sufficiently 
marshal the evidence. Specifically, the Defendant claims that Ms. Zoumadakis did not 
"marshal all of the evidence" and failed "to present any argument why such evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict". (Appellee Brief-pg 10). 
Plaintiff's brief outlined all of the statements that could be used to support the jury 
verdict that Dr. Mason's statements were not published. These statements included Dr. 
Mason, Lloyd Nielsen, and Karlene Jensen all stating that they "did not recall" the exact 
words which were used stating that the Plaintiff was "playing doctor without a license". 
(Appellee Brief-pgs 19-20). 
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The Court exhibits evidence the defamatory words, and the marshaled statements 
can be die only defense against whether the statements were in fact published by Dr. 
Mason. The Defendant has not produced anything else that the Plaintiff could have 
marshaled which was omitted. Every scrap of evidence supporting the verdict was 
marshaled. 
The Defendant asserts that because Vicky Holzman's document which is in Ms. 
Zoumadakis' employment personnel file, (Trial Exhibit 1), characterized Dr. Mason 
statement that Ms. Zoumadakis was a "Home Health nurse playing doctor without a 
license"; that the Plaintiff had a duty to call Ms. Holtzman as a witness to clarify that is 
exactly what he said. If Ms. Holzman did not hear Dr. Mason make that statement, then 
the defense should have called her as a witness, which they did not. The document is 
proof of a published defamatory statement. 
Further, Lloyd Nielsen's "Corrective Disciplinary Action document, which is also 
in Ms. Zoumadakis' employment personnel file, irrefutably states, "He [Dr. Mason] states 
she is a home health nurse playing MD without a license." (Trial Exhibit 3). 
When Nielsen was questioned further regarding whether or not Dr. Mason spoke 
the defamatory words to him, he said under oath, "Correct". Dr. Nielsen tried to waiver 
from the statements he wrote in trial exhibit 3, by further stating "something, and I don't 
know if that is the exact word but it was that, yes. That is what he said." (Trial Transcript 
660 of record-page 110-paras 12-19). 
Plaintiff does not dispute her marshaling obligation, and believes that she has 
brought to light any statement or other evidence to support the jury's verdict that Dr. 
Mason did not publish the statements, but believes that the jury did not understand the 
jury instructions, because the evidence does not support the verdict. 
Finally, as asserted by the Defendant, Dr. Mason testified similarly as Nielsen and 
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Jensen did that "I don't remember the exact words I used." He also stated he did not 
recall again, and then went into a discourse as to how the term "playing doctor without a 
license" is a 'Very common colloquialism". (Trial Transcript 660 of record-page 
198-paras 8-24 and page 199-paras 1 -7). Dr. Mason never refutes that he said the 
defamatory words to Nielsen or Holtzman- As such the defamatory words were published. 
B. THE JURY VERDICT FAILS ON ALL GROUNDS 
Although a jury verdict can be sustained on other grounds if one ground fails, Ms. 
Zoumadakis' claim of defamation against Dr. Mason has been proven on all elements. 
Plaintiff has already clearly and succinctly outlines how after publication has been 
proven, that the other defamation elements of how the statements made by Dr. Mason 
were false and defamatory; how there was either no qualified privilege, or the qualified 
privilege was overcome by a showing of Dr. Mason's malice; and how Ms. Zoumadakis 
suffered horrible damages specifically because of the defamation against her by her lost 
income, lost benefits, damaged reputation, severe anxiety and depression, medical bills 
loss of life's enjoyments, and a lost home. All of these elements of defamation have been 
sufficiently outlined in her opening brief. (See Appellant Brief-pages 22-28), 
Without further belaboring the same evidence, it is clear that the jury verdict must 
be overturned, and that Ms. Zoumadakis be awarded her damages. 
2. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AWARD FOR ALL DEFENDANTS 
SHOULD BE REVERSED, AS THE COURT ERRED BY FINDING THAT 
THERE WERE NOT GENUINE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN DISPUTE, 
AND THAT MALICE OBVIATED ANY QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE. 
A. Dr. Mason's Statement was not true. 
Defendant Mason states that just because a patient claims something, such as that 
the Plaintiff smelled of alcohol, that it makes Dr. Mason's statement true. Ms. 
Zoumadakis has consistently denied the statement, and deserved to have her denial heard 
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on the merits 
Dr. Mason presented an affidavit of the patient (who died, not long after he signed 
it) stating what he thought he smelled. The court held that sinrrr^rv judgment w ^ mv--*• * 
K^' -MK-r . . < .. ,. reported 10 nun. Ibis?-. <• en i \ - ^ e 
very least Dr. Mason had a d.in to investigate the patient's statement. He did not, but 
used the statement to maliciously remove Ms. Zoumadakis as a nurse from UBMC Keep 
i i iiiind thai nun ti testimony was given by Chris Dalsing, former director of UBMC's 
t ,il Therapy Department as to the lack of voracity of this specific patient. (Court 
i iii ii n e 311). IfDr* Mason spoke to anyone at UBMC ihnut tVss^vific patter 
tii.iv have thought twice alwnn1 (iling his compu 
B. Dr. Mason's Statement was not subject to a qualified privilege. The 
patient's statements were not true. 
As still 'J iii llii; opciikhjj, biii't,' Utdinarily, the question of whether the statements 
were maliciously published would be one for a trier of fact" Lind v. Lynch. 665 1\*.« 
. .278,1279 (Utah 1983). 
I (lit" lad ilul someone compui... Joes not mu*e it a true statement. Yes. they 
complained, but Dr. Mason knew that > because of the patient^ 
history. Cris Dalsingte? **is rkno^iwu >
 t aad 
made i ,,:r^ '^.aip^ JLM.H t everyone, ana nounng ever came of the complaints, 
(Court Record-page 311). Dr. Mason did absolutely no investigation into the truth of the 
patient's statements. If he du not know of the patient's hist* <• . dieged •* let'.-nc ; 
brief; and did - - > * . . . . . ±gy should have old him about the 
unsupported compter* f by Mr. Daising It is improper to hold that just because 
someone makes a statement and that statement is communicate-:7, * , r T,I is 
true. The jury should Ii \\n* lit nd tnese claims on trie merib. 
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The malice shown by Dr. Mason against Ms. Zoumadakis has been carefully 
outlined in our prior brief. The malice includes: Dr. Mason's inability to prove that Ms. 
Zoumadakis was playing doctor without a license; Dr. Mason threatening to take his 
home health care business to Applegate Home Health if Ms. Zoumadakis sees any of his 
patients; and communicating false statements from a patient that had a history of untrue 
complaints. (Pg 194 and 196 of Record), (Trial Transcript 660 of Record-page 111-paras 
7-24 and page 112- paras 1-24 and page 125-paras 1-20). 
As such, this matter should have been heard on the merits. 
C. The defamatory statements of Carolyn Smith were not speculative. 
As stated in the previous brief Carolyn Smith was Dr. Mason's assistant at the 
time of the defamation. Because of the great discrepancy between what Ms. Zoumadakis 
told Smith on the phone and what Dr. Mason thought what happening, it was not beyond 
the pale or "speculative" that she told Dr. Mason untrue defamatory statements that 
damaged the Plaintiff. 
Even if the trial record is not used to reverse summary judgment, it was clearly 
stated by Ms. Zoumadakis that she did not speak to Dr. Mason, and only spoke to Ms. 
Smith regarding the treatment of some of his patients* and this led to Dr. Mason's charge 
of Ms. Zoumadakis "Playing doctor with a license", non-speculative defamation of 
character. It is not speculative to properly assume that Ms. Smith communicated 
falsehoods to Dr. Mason which became the subject of his complaints to UBMC. 
Certainly there was enough evidence to hear this matter on the merits. 
Regarding whether there was a qualified privilege regarding Ms. Smith's 
statements to Dr. Mason, as stated in the previous brief, a qualified privilege can be 
obviated if malice can be shown to be the root cause of the defamatory statements. Lind 
V, Lymh 665 P.2d 1276, 1278,1279 (Utah 1983). 
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As stated in our previous brief, it is unknown why Smith would tell Dr. Mason 
that Ms. Zoumadakis was questioning his care. It is very possible that because Smith and 
Mason worked closely together every day, that they talked often about either nurse 
complaints or patient complaints, and that they became tired of Ms. Zoumadakis quoting 
Medicare rules or her asking for help for wounds that were not healing. Whatever the 
reason, Smith's testimony evidences malice because neither her nor Mason could 
articulate how Ms. Zoumadakis was questioning Mason's care, notwithstanding the 
defamatory statements. Further, even though Ms. Zoumadakis wanted to talk to Dr. 
Mason about the care of patients, Dr. Mason testified that he was told by his nurse, [Ms. 
Smith] that Ms.. Zoumadakis refused to talk to him. (Trial Transcript 660 of Record-page 
222-paras 16-24; and page 223-paras 1-10). 
If we get past the allegation that Smith's statements were speculative, then it 
would be up to the jury to determine if Smith said her defamatory statements with malice 
to overcome any qualified privilege. 
D. Lloyd Nielson's statements in the Corrective Discliplinary Action were 
defamatory and untrue, published in Ms. Zoumadakis' employee file which is used 
for third person future employers, and was not subject to a qualified privilege. 
The Court granted summary judgment on behalf of Lloyd Nielsen, holding that the 
items in the Corrective Disciplinary Report were true, were not published to third parties, 
and were subject to a qualified privilege. (Court record-page 444) 
j 1. The statements in the Disciplinary corrective report were untrue. 
Whether the statements in the report were true or not is a material fact in dispute 
which should be decided by the jury. Whether or not Mr. Nielson knew they were true is 
also a fact that needed to be decided by the jury. As stated previously, just because a 
person makes a statement (Dr. Mason) does not make it true, and the fact-finder needs to 
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decide if Nielson knew the statements were not true yet published it in the Plaintiff 
employee file. Clearly, Mr. Nielson had not one shred of evidence that Ms. Zoumadakis 
was playing doctor without a license, as no evidence was presented alleging so. 
Ms. Zoumadakis repeatedly stated that she did not have alcohol on her breath, did 
not play doctor without a license, and did not question the doctor's care of patients. The 
defamatory report stated otherwise. This matter should have gone to the jury. 
2. The items in the Corrective Disciplinary Action were published to third 
parties. 
The Corrective Disciplinary Report was made a part of Ms. Zoumadakis employee 
file. In the trial against Dr. Mason, although Ms. Jensen stated that the tilings in employee 
files are not disseminated to prospective employers, she stated that as a hiring nurse, if 
she saw these defamatory items in a nurse's file looking for work, that she would not hire 
her. Clearly published to be used for hiring and giving recommendations. (Trial 
Transcript 661 of Record-page 155-paras 2-15). Also, somehow the statements in this 
report became public knowledge in the community. 
As stated in our previous brief, it is beyond reason that the items in an employee 
file would not be subject to review by a further prospective employer. At the very least, a 
phone call from a prospective employer would disseminate the gist of the information, 
which is highly defamatory. 
3. Nielsen's malice in publishing the Report overcomes any qualified 
privilege. 
As stated in our previous brief, the evidence of Mr. Nielson's malice includes: 
1. Stating in the report that Ms. Zoumadakis was "playing doctor without a 
license" even though there was not any evidence to prove the statement. When asked in 
trial what Mason said to him as to how the Plaintiff was playing doctor without a 
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license, he stated that she would go into homes and question Dr. Mason's orders. 
Nothing was stated by Mason regarding her prescribing anything, nor actually practicing 
or playing doctor without a license. (Trial Transcript 660 of Record-page 205-paras 3-24; 
and page 206-parasl-10). 
Although the accusations were refuted by Ms. Zoumadakis, it is a genuine issue 
of material fact in dispute which should have gone to the jury, and is not evidence of 
"playing doctor without a license". 
2. Mr. Nielson not allowing Ms. Zoumadakis to speak or even write a letter to Dr. 
Mason to find out what happened. The letter Ms. Zoumadakis prepared was confiscated 
by Nielson and never given to Mason. (Trial Transcript 661 of Record-page 61-paras 
10-24). 
Mason complained that the Plaintiff never tried to talk to him, and Zoumadakis 
complained that Mason would not talk to her. Nielson undermined any communication 
between the two, specifically to get rid of the Plaintiff. 
3. As stated in our previous brief, Nielson gave Ms. Zoumadakis an impossible 
task in the Corrective Disciplinary Action. (Court file-pages 196-197). It would have been 
impossible to follow the rules in the Corrective Disciplinary Action. 
Mr. Nielsen noted on the bottom of the Action that Ms. Zoumadakis refused to 
sign the Action and she was terminated. (Court record-pages 196-19). 
As stated previously, although the allegations were "Very serious" (as Nielsen 
stated in trial) none of the charges were reported to the Nursing Board or Division of 
Licensing for investigation. 
The whole purpose of the Corrective Disciplinary Action was to terminate Ms. 
Zoumadakis' employment evidencing malice. 
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E. UBMC's statements to the Utah Department of Workforce Services were untrue 
and defamatory and subjected the Plaintiff to fraud upon the State. 
Defendants claim that the false statement that the Plaintiff quit rather than was 
fired is not defamatory because it does not impugn Ms. Zoumadakis' "honesty, integrity, 
virtue, or reputation../9. (Defendant's Brief on page 22). 
As stated in our opening brief, when Ms. Zoumadakis was fired for not signing 
the Corrective Disciplinary Action, she filed for unemployment benefits. UBMC 
retaliated, stating that she was not entitled to benefits because she quit rather than was 
fired. (Court Record-page 277). The Administrative Court held that" This person is 
eligible for unemployment insurance benefits because the reason for his or her discharge 
from your firm or organization was not disqualifying". (Court Record-page 276). 
The items in Ms. Zoumadakis' file with DWS are public record. As such, it was 
completely defamatory that UBMC stated that she voluntarily quit when she was 
terminated from her job. By publishing these false statements against the Plaintiff, and it 
being in her file, the credibility of Ms. Zoumadakis will be diminished to future 
employers and to DWS if she ever needs benefits in the future. Further, Ms. Zoumadakis 
may have been subject to fraud allegations by the State of Utah because of the statements 
ofUBMCtoDWS. 
F. UBMC'S and Carlene Jensen's Statements made in the Quarterly Review 
Meeting that were heard by Cris Dalsing and other Employees were untrue, 
defamatory, and not protected by a Qualified Privilege. 
Defendant claims that summary judgment was appropriate because the Plaintiff 
failed to present evidence that lower level employees were present who may have heard 
the defamatory remarks. In Plaintiff's objection to motion for Summary Judgment, she 
outlines and quotes Cris Dalsing's deposition transcript stating that in the quarterly 
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meeting Ms. Jensen stated loud enough to be heard by other employees the defamatory 
remarks, and made no attempt to tell anyone that the statements were confidential. (See 
Objection to Summary Judgment-Page 11-Quoting Cris Dalsing Depo-page 40).(Court 
record-page 311-312; and page 280). 
The fact that after this meeting took place that it spread throughout Ms. 
Zoumadakis' community that she was "drinking on die job" evidences that somehow the 
defamatory statements were published, more likely than not from Ms. Jensen's 
statements. (Court Record- pages 283-293). We submit that this is not speculative, and is 
evidence of defamatory statements being published into the community by UBMC. 
As previously outlined, there is a genuine material issue of fact in dispute as to 
whether the statements made by UBMC were true or not, and published by UBMC nurses 
who were at that meeting, and these items should have been decided by the jury. As such, 
summary judgment should be reversed, and this matter be heard on the merits by a jury. 
G. UBMC'S Nurse's statements are attributable to the Defendants, were untrue, 
and Defamatory, and Evidences UBMC's Defamation of Character against Ms. 
Zoumadakis. 
Defendants claim that the unidentified nurses who spread the defamatory 
statements against Ms. Zoumadakis does not attach to UBMC because of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, and that the nurses acted outside the scope of their employment, 
quoting Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989) (Defendants' brief-page 
25). 
In Birkner. a social worker sexually touched a patient which was admittedly 
non-therapeutic. In fact, it was against he State rules and the therapists rules of behavior. 
(Birkner at 1057). The Utah Supreme court correctly ruled in that case that the therapist 
acted outside the scope of his employment, and Salt Lake County was exonerated. 
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In the present matter, some of the defamatory remarks came directly from Dr. 
Mason (playing doctor without a license), put into Ms* Zoumadakis' file without any 
investigation by UBMC and if s agents, and allowed to get out into the community by 
publishing it in Ms. Zoumadakis employment file, the Dept. of Workforce Services file 
(Quit rather than being fire), was disseminated in the Quarterly Review Meeting without a 
warning regarding confidentiality; and spread into the community by various un-named 
nurses (as stated in Plaintiffs affidavits). The Defendants are improperly trying to add the 
doctrine of respondeat superior as a hurdle to a charge of defamation even when the 
defamatory remarks and the publication came directly from the defendants themselves. 
As stated previously, UBMC should not be responsible for defamatory statements 
community members discuss among themselves, unless those defamatory statements 
came from UBMC, and were published by UBMC. The court erred in making the blanket 
assumption that all statements made among community members could not be attached to 
UBMC. Ms. Zoumadakis was not given the chance to prove that these statements which 
community members discussed came from UBMC nurses, who improperly heard these 
statements from UBMC 
As such summary judgment should be reversed as against UBMC. 
H. Thacker's Statements to Cook further evidences UBMC's Defamation against 
Ms. Zoumadakis. 
As stated previously whether the statements were true or not should have been 
under the purview of the jury, and Ms. Thacker's statements are further evidence that 
UBMC had improperly disseminated defamatory statements about Ms. Zoumadakis that 
was getting into the community. Ms. Zoumadakis never had alcohol on her breath when 
visiting patients* There was no cause of action against Ms. Thacker, neither did there need 
to be. 
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It is false that Ms. Zoumadakis "did not provide any evidence to dispute Thacker's 
affidavit" as stated in defendants' brief regarding a prior report of a smell of alcohol. 
(Defendants' Brief page 29). Ms. Zoumadakis stated at every occasion that she never had 
an alcohol problem on the job, and that Cris Dalsing nor Linda Cook were ever aware that 
any report of this kind was ever leveled against Ms. Zoumadakis. (See Objection and 
Countermotion for Summary Judgment-pages 11-12). 
As stated in our opening brief, Ms. Cook was the director of Uintah Home Health 
when Ms. Zoumadakis began work there. She never received any complaints about Ms. 
Zoumadakis. She stated that Melany's direct supervisor always gave her good 
evaluations. Ms. Cook moved to a branch office in Vernal, Utah. Ms. Thacker came to 
her branch and told her that Ms. Zoumadakis had been fired for having alcohol on her 
breath when visiting a client. Ms. Thacker told Ms. Cook that there were other complaints 
about Melany before, but Ms. Cook said she never saw any. Lloyd Nielson told Ms. Cook 
not to give Ms, Zoumadakis a letter of recommendation as her previous supervisor, but to 
only write one as her friend. (Court record-page 289). 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Zoumadakis maintains that the jury's verdict is not supported by the 
evidence, and that the evidence in fact supports her contention that she was subject to 
defamation and should be awarded her damages against Dr. Mason. 
Further, Ms. Zoumadakis asserts that there were serious genuine issues of material 
fact in dispute that should have allowed her other defamation claims to go to trial. It is 
unknown why the court allowed Dr. Mason's claims to go to court to determine if there 
was malice, yet did not do the same for the other questions of qualified privilege. 
15 
REPLY TO CROSS-APPEAL 
1. It was proper to deny Summary Judgment regarding Dr. Mason's 
statement that Melany Zoumadakis was "Playing doctor Without a License". 
Defendant Mason argues that Ms. Zoumadakis" claims against him are "only 
unsupported speculation". (See Defendants' brief-page 33), and that Plaintiffs claims 
were '^unsubstantiated argument and conclusions". (Id.). 
In rebuttal, Dr. Mason provided no evidence to support his statement that Ms. 
Zoumadakis was "Playing doctor without a license". She gave no prescriptions, 
administered no medical treatment without a doctor's affirmation, and did nothing to 
undermine Dr. Mason's medical orders. It is serious business to be "Playing doctor 
without a license", and there were no charges to the nursing board or any other 
government agency, nor any internal investigation at UBMC. (Trial Transcript 660 of 
Record-page 208-paras 2-12). 
It is our belief that given the severity of the unsupported statement "Playing doctor 
without a license", the court was well within it's right to find out through a jury of 
fact-finders whether or not Dr. Mason acted with malice to obviate a qualified privilege, 
and to determine whether or not the defamatory statement he made was indeed true, the 
evidence at trial proved Dr. Mason acted with malice and that the statement was false. 
2. The District Court was correct to deny Dr, Mason's Directed Verdict. 
Defendant Mason argues that a directed verdict should have been granted at the 
close of Plaintiffs case in chief, because Ms. Zoumadakis did not meet her burden of 
proving that Dr. Mason maliciously told Lloyd Nielsen and Vicky Holzman that Ms. 
Zoumadakis was "Playing doctor without a license". 
As stated previously when asked in trial (In Plaintiffs case-in-chief), what Mason 
said to Lloyd Nielsen as to how the Plaintiff was playing doctor without a license, Dr. 
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Mason stated that Ms. Zoumadakis would go into homes and question Mason's orders. 
Nothing was stated by Mason regarding her prescribing anything, nor actually practicing 
or playing doctor without a license. The statement was false! (Trial Transcript 660 of 
Record-page 205-paras 3-24; and page 206-parasl-10). 
Further, Dr. Mason testified that he would send all of his patients to another 
health care center if Ms. Zoumadakis was called on to see his patients. (Trial Transcript 
660 of Record-page 202-paras 17-24; and page 203-paras. 1-23). 
Dr. Mason further testified of his ill will toward Ms. Zoumadakis by stating that 
"she exhibited a lot of attitude. She seemed to kind of be a know it all attitude and tended 
to be a little smart in her comments. And somewhat disagreeable if I tried to explain my 
position" (Trial Transcript 660 of Record-page 223-paras 19-24). 
Dr. Mason felt that Ms. Zoumadakis complained a lot to him, and he felt that she 
was questioning his care with the patients. This led to his filing a complaint with UBMC 
(Plaintiffs employer), stating that she was "Playing doctor without a license". (Trial 
Transcript 660 of Record-page 234-paras 1-24; and page 225-paras 1-13). 
Clearly, a directed verdict was improper. There was abundant evidence showing 
that Dr. mason wanted Ms. Zoumadakis gone, and acted with malice by complaining that 
she was "Playing doctor without a license", to her employers, who subsequently fired her. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Dr. Mason published a false statement to the plaintiffs employer which 
got her fired, and that he did so with the necessary malice to obviate a qualified privilege, 
the denial of Dr. Mason's summary judgment motion with regard to his statement 
"Playing doctor without a license" should be upheld. Further, given the evidence outlined 
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above, the court was correct to deny a directed verdict. 
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